Correlation-robust auction design
We study the design of auctions when the auctioneer has limited statistical information about the joint distribution of the bidders' valuations. More specifically, we consider an auctioneer who has an estimate of the marginal distribution of a generic bidder's valuation but does not have r...
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Main Authors: | HE, Wei, Li, Jiangtao |
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Format: | text |
Language: | English |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2022
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Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2409 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3408/viewcontent/Correlation.pdf |
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Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
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