Robust virtual implementation with almost complete information

Robust virtual implementation with almost complete information

Artemov, Kunimoto, and Serrano (2013a,b, henceforth, AKS) study a mechanism design problem where arbitrary restrictions are placed on the set of first-order beliefs of agents. Calling these restrictions Δ, they adopt Δ-rationalizability (Battigalli and Siniscalchi, 2003) and show that Δ-incentive co...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: KUNIMOTO, Takashi
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2020
Subjects:
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first-order belief
incentive compatibility
measurability
robust virtual implementation
rationalizable strategies
Economic Theory
Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2452
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3451/viewcontent/RobustVirtualImp_av.pdf
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Institution: Singapore Management University
Language: English

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https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2452
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3451/viewcontent/RobustVirtualImp_av.pdf

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