Robust virtual implementation with almost complete information
Artemov, Kunimoto, and Serrano (2013a,b, henceforth, AKS) study a mechanism design problem where arbitrary restrictions are placed on the set of first-order beliefs of agents. Calling these restrictions Δ, they adopt Δ-rationalizability (Battigalli and Siniscalchi, 2003) and show that Δ-incentive co...
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Main Author: | KUNIMOTO, Takashi |
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Format: | text |
Language: | English |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2020
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Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2452 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3451/viewcontent/RobustVirtualImp_av.pdf |
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Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
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