The interplay of interdependence and correlation in bilateral trade
Cremer and McLean (1988) show that the seller can extract full surplus almost always by an incentive compatible, individually rational mechanism in a single-unit auction model with a finite type space in which agents’ beliefs are correlated and their valuations can be interdependent. We first show tha...
محفوظ في:
المؤلفون الرئيسيون: | KUNIMOTO, Takashi, ZHANG, Cuiling |
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التنسيق: | text |
اللغة: | English |
منشور في: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2024
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الموضوعات: | |
الوصول للمادة أونلاين: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2747 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3746/viewcontent/interdependence_and_correlation_March_30_2024.pdf |
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المؤسسة: | Singapore Management University |
اللغة: | English |
مواد مشابهة
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