Rank-guaranteed auctions
We propose a combinatorial ascending auction that is “approximately” optimal, requiring minimal rationality to achieve this level of optimality, and is robust to strategic and distributional uncertainties. Specifically, the auction is rankguaranteed, meaning that for any menu M and any valuation pro...
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| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | text |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2024
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2756 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3755/viewcontent/Rank_guaranteed_auctions__003_.pdf |
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| Institution: | Singapore Management University |
| Language: | English |
| Summary: | We propose a combinatorial ascending auction that is “approximately” optimal, requiring minimal rationality to achieve this level of optimality, and is robust to strategic and distributional uncertainties. Specifically, the auction is rankguaranteed, meaning that for any menu M and any valuation profile, the ex-post revenue is guaranteed to be at least as high as the highest revenue achievable from feasible allocations, taking the (|M| + 1)th-highest valuation for each bundle as the price. Our analysis highlights a crucial aspect of combinatorial auction design, namely, the design of menus. We provide simple and sufficient menus in various settings. |
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