Rank-guaranteed auctions
We propose a combinatorial ascending auction that is “approximately” optimal, requiring minimal rationality to achieve this level of optimality, and is robust to strategic and distributional uncertainties. Specifically, the auction is rankguaranteed, meaning that for any menu M and any valuation pro...
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Main Authors: | HE, Wei, LI, Jiangtao, ZHONG, Weijie |
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Format: | text |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2024
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Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2756 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3755/viewcontent/Rank_guaranteed_auctions__003_.pdf |
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Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
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