Rank-guaranteed auctions
We propose a combinatorial ascending auction that is “approximately” optimal, requiring minimal rationality to achieve this level of optimality, and is robust to strategic and distributional uncertainties. Specifically, the auction is rankguaranteed, meaning that for any menu M and any valuation pro...
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2024
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sg-smu-ink.soe_research-37552024-07-31T01:17:04Z Rank-guaranteed auctions HE, Wei LI, Jiangtao ZHONG, Weijie We propose a combinatorial ascending auction that is “approximately” optimal, requiring minimal rationality to achieve this level of optimality, and is robust to strategic and distributional uncertainties. Specifically, the auction is rankguaranteed, meaning that for any menu M and any valuation profile, the ex-post revenue is guaranteed to be at least as high as the highest revenue achievable from feasible allocations, taking the (|M| + 1)th-highest valuation for each bundle as the price. Our analysis highlights a crucial aspect of combinatorial auction design, namely, the design of menus. We provide simple and sufficient menus in various settings. 2024-07-01T07:00:00Z text application/pdf https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2756 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3755/viewcontent/Rank_guaranteed_auctions__003_.pdf http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Research Collection School Of Economics eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University Economic Theory |
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Singapore Management University |
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SMU Libraries |
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Asia |
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Singapore Singapore |
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Economic Theory |
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Economic Theory HE, Wei LI, Jiangtao ZHONG, Weijie Rank-guaranteed auctions |
| description |
We propose a combinatorial ascending auction that is “approximately” optimal, requiring minimal rationality to achieve this level of optimality, and is robust to strategic and distributional uncertainties. Specifically, the auction is rankguaranteed, meaning that for any menu M and any valuation profile, the ex-post revenue is guaranteed to be at least as high as the highest revenue achievable from feasible allocations, taking the (|M| + 1)th-highest valuation for each bundle as the price. Our analysis highlights a crucial aspect of combinatorial auction design, namely, the design of menus. We provide simple and sufficient menus in various settings. |
| format |
text |
| author |
HE, Wei LI, Jiangtao ZHONG, Weijie |
| author_facet |
HE, Wei LI, Jiangtao ZHONG, Weijie |
| author_sort |
HE, Wei |
| title |
Rank-guaranteed auctions |
| title_short |
Rank-guaranteed auctions |
| title_full |
Rank-guaranteed auctions |
| title_fullStr |
Rank-guaranteed auctions |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Rank-guaranteed auctions |
| title_sort |
rank-guaranteed auctions |
| publisher |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University |
| publishDate |
2024 |
| url |
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2756 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3755/viewcontent/Rank_guaranteed_auctions__003_.pdf |
| _version_ |
1814047736081678336 |