Efficient dynamic mechanisms with interdependent valuations

Efficient dynamic mechanisms with interdependent valuations

This paper considers a dynamic environment with interdependent valuations and evolving private information. Under the assumption of “independent types”, we construct an efficient, incentive-compatible mechanism that is also budget-balanced in every period of the game. Our mechanism works in environm...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: HE, Wei, LI, Jiangtao
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2016
Subjects:
Dynamic mechanism design
Efficiency
Observable payoff
Incentive compatibility
Budget balance
Economic Theory
Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2198
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3197/viewcontent/1_s20_S0899825616300239_main.pdf
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Institution: Singapore Management University
Language: English

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https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2198
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3197/viewcontent/1_s20_S0899825616300239_main.pdf

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