Efficient dynamic mechanisms with interdependent valuations

• المؤلفون الرئيسيون: HE, Wei, LI, Jiangtao
• التنسيق: text
• اللغة: English
• منشور في: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2016
• الموضوعات: Dynamic mechanism design; Efficiency; Observable payoff; Incentive compatibility; Budget balance; Economic Theory
• الوصول للمادة أونلاين: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2198; https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3197/viewcontent/1_s20_S0899825616300239_main.pdf

This paper considers a dynamic environment with interdependent valuations and evolving private information. Under the assumption of “independent types”, we construct an efficient, incentive-compatible mechanism that is also budget-balanced in every period of the game. Our mechanism works in environm...