Efficient dynamic mechanisms with interdependent valuations
This paper considers a dynamic environment with interdependent valuations and evolving private information. Under the assumption of “independent types”, we construct an efficient, incentive-compatible mechanism that is also budget-balanced in every period of the game. Our mechanism works in environm...
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sg-smu-ink.soe_research-31972019-06-10T01:58:25Z Efficient dynamic mechanisms with interdependent valuations HE, Wei LI, Jiangtao This paper considers a dynamic environment with interdependent valuations and evolving private information. Under the assumption of “independent types”, we construct an efficient, incentive-compatible mechanism that is also budget-balanced in every period of the game. Our mechanism works in environments where in each period, each agent observes her own realized outcome-decision payoff from the previous period. This extends the insight of Mezzetti (2004) to the dynamic setting. 2016-05-01T07:00:00Z text application/pdf https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2198 info:doi/10.1016/j.geb.2016.04.008 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3197/viewcontent/1_s20_S0899825616300239_main.pdf http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Research Collection School Of Economics eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University Dynamic mechanism design Efficiency Observable payoff Incentive compatibility Budget balance Economic Theory |
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Dynamic mechanism design Efficiency Observable payoff Incentive compatibility Budget balance Economic Theory HE, Wei LI, Jiangtao Efficient dynamic mechanisms with interdependent valuations |
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This paper considers a dynamic environment with interdependent valuations and evolving private information. Under the assumption of “independent types”, we construct an efficient, incentive-compatible mechanism that is also budget-balanced in every period of the game. Our mechanism works in environments where in each period, each agent observes her own realized outcome-decision payoff from the previous period. This extends the insight of Mezzetti (2004) to the dynamic setting. |
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HE, Wei LI, Jiangtao |
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HE, Wei LI, Jiangtao |
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HE, Wei |
title |
Efficient dynamic mechanisms with interdependent valuations |
title_short |
Efficient dynamic mechanisms with interdependent valuations |
title_full |
Efficient dynamic mechanisms with interdependent valuations |
title_fullStr |
Efficient dynamic mechanisms with interdependent valuations |
title_full_unstemmed |
Efficient dynamic mechanisms with interdependent valuations |
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efficient dynamic mechanisms with interdependent valuations |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University |
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2016 |
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https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2198 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3197/viewcontent/1_s20_S0899825616300239_main.pdf |
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