Efficient dynamic mechanisms with interdependent valuations

This paper considers a dynamic environment with interdependent valuations and evolving private information. Under the assumption of “independent types”, we construct an efficient, incentive-compatible mechanism that is also budget-balanced in every period of the game. Our mechanism works in environm...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: HE, Wei, LI, Jiangtao
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2016
Subjects:
Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2198
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3197/viewcontent/1_s20_S0899825616300239_main.pdf
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Institution: Singapore Management University
Language: English
id sg-smu-ink.soe_research-3197
record_format dspace
spelling sg-smu-ink.soe_research-31972019-06-10T01:58:25Z Efficient dynamic mechanisms with interdependent valuations HE, Wei LI, Jiangtao This paper considers a dynamic environment with interdependent valuations and evolving private information. Under the assumption of “independent types”, we construct an efficient, incentive-compatible mechanism that is also budget-balanced in every period of the game. Our mechanism works in environments where in each period, each agent observes her own realized outcome-decision payoff from the previous period. This extends the insight of Mezzetti (2004) to the dynamic setting. 2016-05-01T07:00:00Z text application/pdf https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2198 info:doi/10.1016/j.geb.2016.04.008 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3197/viewcontent/1_s20_S0899825616300239_main.pdf http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Research Collection School Of Economics eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University Dynamic mechanism design Efficiency Observable payoff Incentive compatibility Budget balance Economic Theory
institution Singapore Management University
building SMU Libraries
continent Asia
country Singapore
Singapore
content_provider SMU Libraries
collection InK@SMU
language English
topic Dynamic mechanism design
Efficiency
Observable payoff
Incentive compatibility
Budget balance
Economic Theory
spellingShingle Dynamic mechanism design
Efficiency
Observable payoff
Incentive compatibility
Budget balance
Economic Theory
HE, Wei
LI, Jiangtao
Efficient dynamic mechanisms with interdependent valuations
description This paper considers a dynamic environment with interdependent valuations and evolving private information. Under the assumption of “independent types”, we construct an efficient, incentive-compatible mechanism that is also budget-balanced in every period of the game. Our mechanism works in environments where in each period, each agent observes her own realized outcome-decision payoff from the previous period. This extends the insight of Mezzetti (2004) to the dynamic setting.
format text
author HE, Wei
LI, Jiangtao
author_facet HE, Wei
LI, Jiangtao
author_sort HE, Wei
title Efficient dynamic mechanisms with interdependent valuations
title_short Efficient dynamic mechanisms with interdependent valuations
title_full Efficient dynamic mechanisms with interdependent valuations
title_fullStr Efficient dynamic mechanisms with interdependent valuations
title_full_unstemmed Efficient dynamic mechanisms with interdependent valuations
title_sort efficient dynamic mechanisms with interdependent valuations
publisher Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
publishDate 2016
url https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2198
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3197/viewcontent/1_s20_S0899825616300239_main.pdf
_version_ 1770574321193844736