Efficient dynamic mechanisms with interdependent valuations
This paper considers a dynamic environment with interdependent valuations and evolving private information. Under the assumption of “independent types”, we construct an efficient, incentive-compatible mechanism that is also budget-balanced in every period of the game. Our mechanism works in environm...
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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | text |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2016
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2198 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3197/viewcontent/1_s20_S0899825616300239_main.pdf |
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| Institution: | Singapore Management University |
| Language: | English |