Enhancing effort supply with prize-augmenting entry fees : theory and experiments
Entry fees are widely observed in contests. We study the effect of a prize-augmenting entry fee on expected total effort in an all-pay auction setting where the contestants' abilities are private information. An entry fee reduces equilibrium entry but can enhance the entrants' effort suppl...
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Main Authors: | Hammond, Robert G., Liu, Bin, Lu, Jingfeng, Riyanto, Yohanes Eko |
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Other Authors: | School of Social Sciences |
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
2021
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/151228 |
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Institution: | Nanyang Technological University |
Language: | English |
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