Efficient and optimal mechanisms with private information acquisition costs
10.1016/j.jet.2012.12.009
Saved in:
Main Authors: | Lu, J., Ye, L. |
---|---|
Other Authors: | ECONOMICS |
Format: | Article |
Published: |
2014
|
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/52099 |
Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
Institution: | National University of Singapore |
Similar Items
-
Why a simple second-price auction induces efficient endogenous entry
by: Lu, J.
Published: (2011) -
Auction design with opportunity cost
by: Lu, J.
Published: (2011) -
ESSAYS ON INFORMATION DESIGN AND ROBUST AUCTION DESIGN
by: YANG XIANGQIAN
Published: (2021) -
Auction design: An experimental approach in assessing economic criteria in auction formats
by: Ang, Sandy K., et al.
Published: (2006) -
Revenue implication of auction value in k-price sealed-bid auctions: An experimental study
by: Lim, W.S., et al.
Published: (2013)