A Public Procurement Combinatorial Auction Mechanism with Quality Assignment
This article focuses on mechanism design for quality assignment combinatorial procurement auctions. We model how the participants can maximize social surplus, the difference between gross utility and total cost in electronic procurement, while selecting appropriate quality standards for the procured...
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| Main Authors: | , , |
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| 格式: | text |
| 語言: | English |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2011
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| 主題: | |
| 在線閱讀: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/2180 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.dss.2011.02.012 |
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