Mechanism Design for E-Procurement Auctions: On the Efficacy of Post-Auction Negotiation and Quality Effort Incentives
Practical mechanisms for procurement involve bidding, negotiation, transfer payments and subsidies, and the possibility of verification of unobservable product and service quality. We model two proposed multi-stage procurement mechanisms. One focuses on the auction price that is established, and the...
Saved in:
Main Authors: | Huang, H., Kauffman, Robert John, Xu, H., Zhao, L. |
---|---|
Format: | text |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2011
|
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/2188 |
Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
Similar Items
-
Mechanism Design for E- Procurement Auctions: On the Efficacy of Post-Auction Negotiation and Quality Effort Incentives
by: HUANG, He, et al.
Published: (2011) -
Relationship preserving auction for repeated e-procurement
by: Park J.,, et al.
Published: (2008) -
Relationship-Preserving E-Procurement Auction
by: LAU, Hoong Chuin, et al.
Published: (2008) -
A Public Procurement Combinatorial Auction Mechanism with Quality Assignment
by: CHEN, J., et al.
Published: (2011) -
Analyzing Auction and Bargaining Mechanism Design in E-Procurement with Quality Verification and Risk Aversion.
by: Huang, H., et al.
Published: (2013)