Does accounting conservatism mitigate the shortcomings of CEO overconfidence?
Overconfident CEOs are more willing to initiate investment projects that require experimentation, yet tend to defer responding to the bad news when the project is not performing as planned. Accounting conservatism accelerates the recognition of the bad news and its dissemination to gatekeepers, maki...
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Main Authors: | HSU, Charles, NOVOSELOV, Kirill E., WANG, Rencheng |
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格式: | text |
語言: | English |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2017
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在線閱讀: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/1815 |
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機構: | Singapore Management University |
語言: | English |
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