Conflict with Quitting Rights: A Mechanism Design Approach
Why do agents engage in costly dispute resolution such as litigation and arbitration when costless settlement is available? I present a model with one sided asymmetric information where the payoff from litigation for both agents depends on the beliefs of the uninformed agent. Taking these payoffs as...
Saved in:
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | text |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2012
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1385 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2384/viewcontent/18_2012_ConflictwithQuittingRightsAMechanismDesignApproach.pdf |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| Institution: | Singapore Management University |
| Language: | English |