How robust is undominated Nash implementation?
Palfrey and Srivastava (1991) show that almost any social choice correspondence(SCC) is implemented in undominated Nash equilibrium, a refinement of Nash equilibrium. By requiring solution concepts to have closed graph in the limit of complete information, Chung and Ely (2003) investigate the robust...
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| 格式: | text |
| 語言: | English |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2010
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| 在線閱讀: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2076 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3075/viewcontent/How_Robust_is_Undominated_Nash_Implementation.pdf |
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| 機構: | Singapore Management University |
| 語言: | English |