How robust is undominated Nash implementation?

• المؤلف الرئيسي: KUNIMOTO, Takashi
• التنسيق: text
• اللغة: English
• منشور في: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2010
• الموضوعات: Approximate common knowledge; Implementation; Monotonicity; Robustness; Undominated Nash equilibrium; Economic Theory
• الوصول للمادة أونلاين: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2076; https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3075/viewcontent/How_Robust_is_Undominated_Nash_Implementation.pdf

Palfrey and Srivastava (1991) show that almost any social choice correspondence(SCC) is implemented in undominated Nash equilibrium, a refinement of Nash equilibrium. By requiring solution concepts to have closed graph in the limit of complete information, Chung and Ely (2003) investigate the robust...