A large class of strategy-proof exchange rules with single-peaked preferences
We study the classical house exchange problem (Shapley and Scarf (1974)) and identified a large class of rules, each of which is strategy-proof, efficient, and individually rational with single-peaked preferences. These rules are generalisations of Gale’s top trading cycles rule: In each step a subs...
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| Format: | text |
| Language: | English |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2018
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| Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2176 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3167/viewcontent/Exchange_rules_on_single_peaked_domains.pdf |
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| Institution: | Singapore Management University |
| Language: | English |
| Summary: | We study the classical house exchange problem (Shapley and Scarf (1974)) and identified a large class of rules, each of which is strategy-proof, efficient, and individually rational with single-peaked preferences. These rules are generalisations of Gale’s top trading cycles rule: In each step a subset of houses are allowed to be traded along top trading cycles and in particular, the next step subset of trading houses may depend on the exchanges happened already. We believe that the flexibility introduced by this class of rules is desirable when the designer faces some context-specific requirements. |
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