A large class of strategy-proof exchange rules with single-peaked preferences
We study the classical house exchange problem (Shapley and Scarf (1974)) and identified a large class of rules, each of which is strategy-proof, efficient, and individually rational with single-peaked preferences. These rules are generalisations of Gale’s top trading cycles rule: In each step a subs...
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| Format: | text |
| Language: | English |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2018
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| Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2176 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3167/viewcontent/Exchange_rules_on_single_peaked_domains.pdf |
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| Institution: | Singapore Management University |
| Language: | English |
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