A large class of strategy-proof exchange rules with single-peaked preferences

We study the classical house exchange problem (Shapley and Scarf (1974)) and identified a large class of rules, each of which is strategy-proof, efficient, and individually rational with single-peaked preferences. These rules are generalisations of Gale’s top trading cycles rule: In each step a subs...

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Main Author:	LIU, Peng
Format:	text
Language:	English
Published:	Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2018
Subjects:	Top trading cycles strategy-proof single-peaked Economic Theory
Online Access:	https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2176 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3167/viewcontent/Exchange_rules_on_single_peaked_domains.pdf
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Institution:	Singapore Management University
Language:	English

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spelling	sg-smu-ink.soe_research-31672019-05-20T14:17:40Z A large class of strategy-proof exchange rules with single-peaked preferences LIU, Peng We study the classical house exchange problem (Shapley and Scarf (1974)) and identified a large class of rules, each of which is strategy-proof, efficient, and individually rational with single-peaked preferences. These rules are generalisations of Gale’s top trading cycles rule: In each step a subset of houses are allowed to be traded along top trading cycles and in particular, the next step subset of trading houses may depend on the exchanges happened already. We believe that the flexibility introduced by this class of rules is desirable when the designer faces some context-specific requirements. 2018-02-01T08:00:00Z text application/pdf https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2176 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3167/viewcontent/Exchange_rules_on_single_peaked_domains.pdf http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Research Collection School Of Economics eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University Top trading cycles strategy-proof single-peaked Economic Theory
institution	Singapore Management University
building	SMU Libraries
continent	Asia
country	Singapore Singapore
content_provider	SMU Libraries
collection	InK@SMU
language	English
topic	Top trading cycles strategy-proof single-peaked Economic Theory
spellingShingle	Top trading cycles strategy-proof single-peaked Economic Theory LIU, Peng A large class of strategy-proof exchange rules with single-peaked preferences
description	We study the classical house exchange problem (Shapley and Scarf (1974)) and identified a large class of rules, each of which is strategy-proof, efficient, and individually rational with single-peaked preferences. These rules are generalisations of Gale’s top trading cycles rule: In each step a subset of houses are allowed to be traded along top trading cycles and in particular, the next step subset of trading houses may depend on the exchanges happened already. We believe that the flexibility introduced by this class of rules is desirable when the designer faces some context-specific requirements.
format	text
author	LIU, Peng
author_facet	LIU, Peng
author_sort	LIU, Peng
title	A large class of strategy-proof exchange rules with single-peaked preferences
title_short	A large class of strategy-proof exchange rules with single-peaked preferences
title_full	A large class of strategy-proof exchange rules with single-peaked preferences
title_fullStr	A large class of strategy-proof exchange rules with single-peaked preferences
title_full_unstemmed	A large class of strategy-proof exchange rules with single-peaked preferences
title_sort	large class of strategy-proof exchange rules with single-peaked preferences
publisher	Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
publishDate	2018
url	https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2176 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3167/viewcontent/Exchange_rules_on_single_peaked_domains.pdf
_version_	1770574123873861632

A large class of strategy-proof exchange rules with single-peaked preferences

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