Strategically simple mechanisms
We define and investigate a property of mechanisms that we call "strategic simplicity," and that is meant to capture the idea that, in strategically simple mechanisms, strategic choices require limited strategic sophistication. We define a mechanism to be strategically simple if choices ca...
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Main Authors: | BÖRGERS, Tilman, LI, Jiangtao |
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Format: | text |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2019
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2328 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3327/viewcontent/B_rgers_et_al_2019_Econometrica.pdf |
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Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
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