Robust virtual implementation with almost complete information

• المؤلف الرئيسي: KUNIMOTO, Takashi
• التنسيق: text
• اللغة: English
• منشور في: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2020
• الموضوعات: Complete information; first-order belief; incentive compatibility; measurability; robust virtual implementation; rationalizable strategies; Economic Theory
• الوصول للمادة أونلاين: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2452; https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3451/viewcontent/RobustVirtualImp_av.pdf

Artemov, Kunimoto, and Serrano (2013a,b, henceforth, AKS) study a mechanism design problem where arbitrary restrictions are placed on the set of first-order beliefs of agents. Calling these restrictions Δ, they adopt Δ-rationalizability (Battigalli and Siniscalchi, 2003) and show that Δ-incentive co...