Are simple mechanisms optimal when agents are unsophisticated?
We study the design of mechanisms involving agents that have limited strategic sophistication. We define a mechanism to be simple if—given the assumed level of strategic sophistication—agents can determine their optimal strategy. We examine whether it is optimal for the mechanism designer who faces...
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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | text |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2022
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2547 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3546/viewcontent/SimpleOptimal__1_.pdf |
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| Institution: | Singapore Management University |
| Language: | English |