Are simple mechanisms optimal when agents are unsophisticated?
We study the design of mechanisms involving agents that have limited strategic sophistication. The literature has identified several notions of simple mechanisms in which agents can determine their optimal strategy even if they lack cognitive skills such as predicting other agents' strategies (...
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Main Authors: | LI, Jiangtao, DWORCZAK, Piotr |
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Format: | text |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2021
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Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2548 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3547/viewcontent/3465456.3467606__1_.pdf |
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Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
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