Worst-Case Mechanism Design via Bayesian Analysis
Budget feasible mechanism design is the study of procurement combinatorial auctions in which the sellers have private costs to produce items, and the buyer (auctioneer) aims to maximize her valuation function on a subset of purchased items under the budget constraint on the total payment. One of the...
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| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| 格式: | Article |
| 語言: | English |
| 出版: |
2017
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| 主題: | |
| 在線閱讀: | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/86533 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/44041 |
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