Agency costs and management contracting: Granting executive stock options as a strategic compensation practice?
10.1109/MWC.2006.1593521
Saved in:
Main Authors: | Lam, S.-S., Ho, Y.-K. |
---|---|
Other Authors: | FINANCE & ACCOUNTING |
Format: | Article |
Published: |
2013
|
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/44489 |
Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
Institution: | National University of Singapore |
Similar Items
-
Do executive stock option grants have value implications for firm performance?
by: Lam, S.-S., et al.
Published: (2013) -
The determinants of executive stock option grants and the link between executive stock option grants and firm performance
by: CHNG BEY FEN
Published: (2010) -
Controllability of risk and the design of incentive-compensation contracts
by: ARMSTRONG, Christopher, et al.
Published: (2019) -
Corporate Hedging and the Design of Incentive-Compensation Contracts
by: ARMSTRONG, Chris, et al.
Published: (2016) -
Executive compensation and firm performance in New Zealand: The role of employee stock option plans
by: DING, David K., et al.
Published: (2021)