Analyzing Auction and Bargaining Mechanisms in E-Procurement with Supply Quality Risk
We compare two mechanisms from the buyer’s perspective in multi-attribute supply procurement, with verifiable and unverifiable quality of the supplies and risk aversion to deviation from acceptable quality: an auction mechanism and a generalized Nash bargaining mechanism. We develop a model to repre...
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Main Authors: | HUANG, He, XU, Hongyan, Kauffman, Robert J., SUN, Ning |
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Format: | text |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2013
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Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/2111 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2013.04.003 |
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Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
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