Tops-Only Domains

In this paper we consider the standard voting model with a finite set of alternatives A and n voters and address the following question: what are the characteristics of domains D that induce the property that every strategy-proof social choice function f : Dn → A satisfying unanimity, has the tops-o...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: CHATTERJI, Shurojit, SEN, Arunava
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2009
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Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1139
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2138/viewcontent/topsfeb09_2_.pdf
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Institution: Singapore Management University
Language: English

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