Tops-Only Domains
In this paper we consider the standard voting model with a finite set of alternatives A and n voters and address the following question: what are the characteristics of domains D that induce the property that every strategy-proof social choice function f : Dn → A satisfying unanimity, has the tops-o...
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| Main Authors: | , |
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| 格式: | text |
| 語言: | English |
| 出版: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2009
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| 主題: | |
| 在線閱讀: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1139 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2138/viewcontent/topsfeb09_2_.pdf |
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