Who Will Monitor the Monitors? Informal Law Enforcement and Collusion at Champagne
Informal monitors can sometimes substitute for formal law enforcement. Monitors hired to minimize cheating, however, are themselves vulnerable to collusion and extortion. I focus on one such informal monitor – the fair authorities at the trade fairs at Champagne – asking why the fairs survived for c...
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Main Author: | GUHA, Brishti |
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Format: | text |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2012
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Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1382 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2012.05.017 |
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Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
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