Board Interlocks and the Adoption of Stock Option Pay
This study investigates the effects of different types of director interlocks (sent and received ties) on the adoption of stock option pay among Japanese firms. Our findings show that sent ties are significantly related to the adoption of stock option pay whereas received ties are not, thus confirmi...
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Main Authors: | Yoshikawa, Toru, SHIM, Jung Wook, Tuschke, Anja C. |
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Format: | text |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2013
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Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/3580 https://doi.org/10.5465/AMBPP.2013.11802abstract |
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Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
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