Implementation with near complete information: The case of subgame perfection
While monotonicity is a necessary and almost sufficient condition for Nash implementationand often a demanding one, almost any (non-monotonic, for instance) socialchoice rule can be implemented using undominated Nash or subgame perfect equilibrium.By requiring solution concepts to have closed graph...
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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | text |
| Language: | English |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2009
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| Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2075 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3074/viewcontent/continuousSPE_Juillet_24_2009_takashi.pdf |
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| Institution: | Singapore Management University |
| Language: | English |