When Do Board Interlocks Matter? The Adoption of Share Buyback and Stock Option Pay in Japanese Firms
This study examines the adoption of stock buyback and executive stock option compensation in Japanese firms. We investigate whether the presence of interlocking directors who sit on boards of other firms that adopted those practices is related to the adoption of the same practices by the focal firm....
محفوظ في:
المؤلفون الرئيسيون: | YOSHIKAWA, Toru, Shim, J.W. |
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التنسيق: | text |
اللغة: | English |
منشور في: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2012
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الموضوعات: | |
الوصول للمادة أونلاين: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research_smu/73 http://prague.strategicmanagement.mobi/tools/schedule/sessionDetails?id=114 |
الوسوم: |
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مواد مشابهة
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