Insider versus outsider CEOs, executive compensation, and accounting manipulation
This paper examines the role of the financial reporting environment in selecting a new CEO from within versus outside the organization. Weak reporting controls allow the CEO to misreport performance information, which reduces the board's ability to detect and replace poorly-performing CEOs as w...
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Main Authors: | JONGJAROENKAMOL, Prasart, LAUX, Volker |
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Format: | text |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2017
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/1620 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soa_research/article/2647/viewcontent/InsidervOutsideCEOs_2016_pp.pdf |
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Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
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