Inefficient Worker Turnover
This paper considers the efficiency properties of risk-neutral workers’ mobility decisions in an equilibrium model with search frictions, but no search externalities, when the rent accruing to a match is split through bargaining. Matches are ex ante homogeneous and their true productivity is learnt...
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主要作者: | JACQUET, Nicolas L. |
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格式: | text |
語言: | English |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2007
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在線閱讀: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1057 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2056/viewcontent/IWTNLJacquet.pdf |
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