Getting dynamic implementation to work
We develop a new class of two-stage mechanisms, which fully implement any social choice function under initial rationalizability in complete information environments. We show theoretically that our Simultaneous Report (SR) mechanisms are robust to small amounts of incomplete information about the st...
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Main Authors: | CHEN, Yi-Chun, HOLDEN, Richard, KUNIMOTO, Takashi, SUN, Yifei, WILKENING, Tom |
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Format: | text |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2023
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Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2673 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3672/viewcontent/721153_pvoa_cc_by_nc.pdf |
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Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
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