Rationalizable incentives: Interim rationalizable implementation of correspondences

Rationalizable incentives: Interim rationalizable implementation of correspondences

When the normative goals for a set of agents can be summarized in a set-valued rule and agents take actions that are rationalizable, a new theory of incentives emerges in which standard Bayesian incentive compatibility (BIC) is relaxed significantly. The paper studies the interim rationalizable impl...

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書目詳細資料
Main Authors:	KUNIMOTO, Takashi, SARAN, Rene, SERRANO, Roberto
格式:	text
語言:	English
出版:	Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2025
主題:	Rationalizability Implementation correspondences Setwise incentive Compatibility Setwise Dominance Ex-post Efficiency. Economic Theory
在線閱讀:	https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2799 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3798/viewcontent/Rationalizable_Incentives_2025_02_01__Edited___1_.pdf
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機構:	Singapore Management University
語言:	English

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