Indescribability and its irrelevance for contractual incompleteness
The incomplete contracts literature often cites indescribable contingencies as a major obstacle to the creation of completecontracts. Using agents’ minimum foresight concerning possible future payoffs, Maskin and Tirole (Rev Econ Stud 66:83–114, 1999) show that indescribability does not matter for c...
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Main Author: | KUNIMOTO, Takashi |
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Format: | text |
Language: | English |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2010
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Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1987 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2986/viewcontent/101007_2Fs10058_009_0082_y.pdf |
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Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
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