Implementation with transfers
We say that a social choice rule is implementable with (small) transfers if one candesign a mechanism whose set of equilibrium outcomes coincides with that speciÖed bythe rule but the mechanism allows for (small) ex post transfers among the players. Weshow in private-value environments that any ince...
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Main Authors: | CHEN, Yi-Chun, KUNIMOTO, Takashi, SUN, Yifei |
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格式: | text |
語言: | English |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2016
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在線閱讀: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2060 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3059/viewcontent/ISER_Seminar_20160705.pdf |
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機構: | Singapore Management University |
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