Firm-specific knowledge assets and employment arrangements: Evidence from CEO compensation design and CEO dismissal
Research Summary: We argue that firms with greater specificity in knowledge structure need to both encourage their CEOs to stay so that they make investments with a long-term perspective, and provide job securities to the CEOs so that they are less concerned about the risk of being dismissed. Accord...
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Main Authors: | WANG, Heli, ZHAO, Shan, CHEN, Guoli |
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格式: | text |
語言: | English |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2017
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在線閱讀: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/4995 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/lkcsb_research/article/5994/viewcontent/Firm_specific_knowledge_assets_2017_pp.pdf |
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機構: | Singapore Management University |
語言: | English |
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