Incentive compatibility in multi-unit auctions

Incentive compatibility in multi-unit auctions

We characterize incentive compatibility in multi-unit auctions with multi-dimensional types. An allocation mechanism is incentive compatible if and only if it is nondecreasing in marginal utilities (NDMU). The notion of incentive compatibility we adopt is dominant strategy in private value models an...

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書目詳細資料
Main Authors:	BIKHCHANDANI, Sushil, CHATTERJI, Shurojit, SEN, Arunava
格式:	text
語言:	English
出版:	Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2003
主題:	dominant strategy ex post incentive compatibility multi-unit auctions Economic Theory Strategic Management Policy
在線閱讀:	https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2022 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3021/viewcontent/pdf_SB13.pdf
標簽:	添加標簽沒有標簽, 成為第一個標記此記錄!
機構:	Singapore Management University
語言:	English

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