Advertising Competition in Retail Markets
We consider non-price advertising by retail firms that are privately informed as to their respective production costs. We construct an advertising equilibrium, in which informed consumers use an advertising search rule whereby they buy from the highest-advertising firm. Consumers are rational in usi...
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Main Authors: | BAGWELL, Kyle, LEE, Gea Myoung |
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Format: | text |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2010
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Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1305 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2304/viewcontent/bejeap.2010.10.1.2038.pdf |
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Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
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